Benchmark and comparison of tracker-blockers: Should you trust them? by Traverso, Stefano et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
Benchmark and comparison of tracker-blockers: Should you trust them? / Traverso, Stefano; Trevisan, Martino;
Giannantoni, Laura; Mellia, Marco; Metwalley, Hassan. - ELETTRONICO. - (2017), pp. 1-9. ((Intervento presentato al
convegno IEEE/IFIP Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA) tenutosi a Dublin, IE nel 21-23 June
2017.
Original
Benchmark and comparison of tracker-blockers: Should you trust them?
Publisher:
Published
DOI:10.23919/TMA.2017.8002898
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2679579 since: 2017-09-18T11:30:52Z
IEEE
Benchmark and Comparison of Tracker-blockers:
Should You Trust Them?
Stefano Traverso†? Martino Trevisan† Leonardo Giannantoni† Marco Mellia†? Hassan Metwalley†?
†Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Politecnico di Torino, Italy: e-mail: {first.last}@polito.it
?Ermes Cyber Security SRL
Abstract—People are getting more and more conscious and
worried about privacy issues that arise when browsing the Web.
Ad-blockers, anti-tracking extensions, privacy and anonymity
plug-ins, etc. promise to protect users and their privacy from
third-party tracking systems. But how effective are they? In
this paper, we present the first experimental campaign aimed
at benchmarking popular plug-ins for web privacy preservation
to date. We select 7 different plug-ins and setup a testbed
to automatically browse regular web pages, while collecting
navigation data. We analyze this data to compare each plug-
in, considering both privacy-protection and performance angles.
Our results show that the picture is very variable, with no plug-
in being able to guarantee complete protection while improving
performance as promised.
By considering different experimental setups, we also observe
that the European ePrivacy Directive is ignored by the majority
of considered web sites. The directive prevents web services from
installing tracking and profiling cookies before explicit consent
is given by the user, but apparently this is not observed for most
of services.
To favor reproducibility, and repeatability, we share both
the software and the data used to conduct this study with the
community. Our aim is to let researchers and developers better
understand the privacy threats in the Internet, possibly toward
better performing privacy-preserving tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
When connected to the Internet to browse the web, users
contact servers to fetch web pages, some of which contain
images, videos, advertisement, etc., while others collect data
on web page performance and users’ browsing habits. The
latter, the so-called “third-party trackers”, may represent a
serious threat to users’ privacy. Some of these systems build
their business on the massive collection and brokerage of
personal data. Born to offer personalized advertisement, they
track users across different web pages, and build profiles to
be sold to other parties. Because of the lack of a coordinated
and comprehensive regulation, trackers shadow users across
web sites with practically no limits. Thousands of services are
known to behave as tracking systems, but unfortunately it is
hard to obtain an exhaustive list because of their hidden nature.
Many surveys report an increasing worry from users about
their online privacy [1], [2]. This worry has translated in an
actual demand for tools capable of protecting privacy during
browsing. In fact, the most recent years have witnessed a
proliferation of tracker-blockers. Ghostery [3], uBlock [4]
and Blur [5] are among the most prominent ones. A recent
study has estimated that these three together account for
23M users [6]. In parallel, other systems emerged to block
advertisement content, with Adblock Plus [7] being among
the most popular ones, and installed by about 20% of Internet
users in their browsers [8], [9].1
Despite their momentum, little is known about tracker-
blockers and their effectiveness. The research community has
spent a significant effort in studying countermeasures to detect
and defeat trackers (see Sec. VI for a detailed discussion),
but - to the best of our knowledge - no study has focused
on systematically benchmarking tracker-blocker effectiveness.
Filling this gap is very important, also to check for question-
able policies adopted by some of these systems [10], [11].
In this paper we build a testbed to systematically benchmark
and compare seven popular freeware tracker-blockers. Our
goal is to simulate the usage of the average Internet user,
who installs one of these plug-ins, and enjoys the protection
it offers. To this end, we design a custom tool that uses
active measurements for our benchmark. Given the dynamic
nature of web pages, and the complex relationships of objects
they include, designing such a tool requires some ingenuity.
Each page must be visited several times to ensure statistical
significance in data, and the tool must be able to handle
unpredictable events such as page timeouts and crashes which
may halt the browsing emulation. In turn, this inflates the
testing time, therefore a good balance must be considered.
We use the data we collect to assess the effectiveness of
each plug-in to preserve users’ privacy. We count the set of
services contacted by the browser that are included in a super-
set of trackers we build from several sources. From a different
angle, we verify the claims about the ability to improve the
Quality of Experience (QoE), e.g., to speed up the web page
loading time, and to reduce bandwidth usage ( [12]).
In addition, we run experiments to observe the impact of
the “Cookie Policy” notification and acceptance banner web
sites must present when accessed by a user for the first
time. This is imposed by the ePrivacy Directive of European
Commission [13], [14]. In a nutshell, the law imposes the
web site to ask the explicit user consent before installing any
tracking and profiling cookies (or similar mechanisms) and
before contacting any third-party service which uses persistent
cookies (or other tracking mechanisms). Thus, we expect the
second-visit to the same web site to be very different if the
1Ad-blockers and tracker-blockers aims at blocking two different type of
services, even if this distinction is blurred for not expert users.
user provides authorization to the usage of third-party (TP)
cookies.
Our experiments show surprising and unforeseen results.
First, there is a large variance in the effectiveness of each plug-
in. The only one offering a complete protection is Request
Policy [15]. Unfortunately, it blocks all third-party content,
and thus it breaks the web-page rendering. In our tests, the
least effective is Privacy Badger [16], supported by the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). Unfortunately, its internal
algorithm used to identify trackers results ineffective with
fresh browser installation. Differently, Ghostery [3] offers the
best protection. uBlock [4], Disconnect [17] and Blur [5]
provide good protection too, but surprisingly, they fail to block
some very popular trackers.
Considering page loading performance, we observe that data
being downloaded with any plug-in typically decreases due
to less content being fetched by the browser. Despite this,
the page load time may increase (Privacy Badger) or decrease
(uBlock, Disconnect). This is due to the different anti-tracking
approaches, and to the additional complexity of executing the
plug-in code.
Finally, the ePrivacy Directive is mostly ignored by web
designers, so that tracking systems get contacted before the
user has accepted the cookie policy.
We believe the results presented in this paper are useful
for the average Internet user to make an informed choice
on tracker-blocker. To help the community in offering and
updating independent, and scientifically sound experiments,
we make available all software and data we used to conduct
this study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
provides background about web tracking and tracker-blockers.
Sec. III describes the benchmark and datasets we collect.
Sec. IV presents the metrics and Sec. V shows the results.
Sec. VII describes the limitations of our methodology before
discussing related work in Sec. VI. Finally, Sec. VIII con-
cludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Online tracking. During their browsing, users are observed
by both ’first parties’, the sites explicitly visited, and ’third
parties’, support services that offload the main site and serve
additional objects, code, images, etc. Among these, trackers
are usually invisible services embedded in web pages by
webmasters that would like to monetize the content they offer
via, e.g., personalized advertisement. Trackers re-build users’
browsing histories by employing several tracking technologies
(e.g., cookies, super-cookies, fingerprinting [18], [19]) that
let them uniquely identify users across different web sites.
Combined with the “referer” in the HTTP header, they get the
browsing history of the users. From the browsing habits, they
build a profile for each user, that they sell to advertisers via
online auctions [20] (e.g., for personalized advertisement).
2We consider the free version of this plug-in.
TABLE I
PLUG-INS CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY. USAGE STATISTICS PROVIDED BY
MOZILLA ADD-ONS WEBSITE.
Plug-in Approach Blockage Firefox Users
Ghostery Domain-based blacklist Trackers 1.3M
Disconnect 2 Domain-based blacklist Trackers 0.3M
Blur 2 Unknown Trackers 0.16M
uBlock Regexp-based blacklist Trackers 3M
Privacy Badger Behavior-based Trackers 0.1M
Adblock Plus Regexp-based blacklist Ads and Trackers 19M
Request Policy Cross-site-based All third parties 0.07M
Tracking blocking. Trackers represent a menace for user
privacy, thus, tracker-blockers were born to help users pre-
serve their privacy during navigation. In most of the cases,
tracker-blockers are deployed as browser plug-ins (also called
extensions).
For our experiments we consider the seven most popular
freeware plug-ins which offer tracker-blocking features. We
report them in Table I, where we classify them based on
the approach they use to block trackers, and the third-party
services they aim to block. Some of them target advertise-
ments, or/and trackers. Request Policy blocks all third-parties
indiscriminately. Blur [5] does not provide information about
the mechanisms to detect and stop trackers. In general, they
inspect HTML code, and prevent the browser from visiting
URLs headed to tracking services. To achieve this goal, they
have to detect which URLs in a page refer to trackers.
Ghostery [3] and Disconnect [17] leverage blacklists contain-
ing domains of services they classify as trackers. Adblock
Plus [7] and uBlock [4] use regular expressions to match
against the URLs to contact. Whenever the match is positive
the request is blocked. Other tools act differently. Privacy
Badger [16] is an open-source tool provided by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) that blocks more generically objec-
tionable behaviors: if it detects the same third-party domain
tracking the user across different sites, it blocks it. Hence,
the same tracking domain can be blocked or not, depending,
e.g., on the number of times the user meets it during its
browsing trajectory. Request Policy [15] is much more severe.
In fact, it prevents the browser to open cross-site connections
to any third-party, independently from its nature or activity.
This preserves users’ from contacting third-party services, but
dramatically hampers QoE as it blocks the delivery of objects,
e.g., images, fonts, css, etc, from any third-party domain.
The second action tracker-blockers have to perform is
the actual blockage of URL access. To this end, browsers
make some APIs available. For instance, Mozilla Web API’s
http-on-modify-request is an event handler which
allows to modify or cancel HTTP requests before they are
sent.
Cookie Regulation. The first EU’s attempt to provide guide-
lines about data protection and privacy in the digital age
is 2002 E-Privacy Directive [13], namely 2002/58/EC. It
specifically deals with the regulation of treatment of traffic data
and cookies. It was then amended by directive 2009/136 [14],
which made cookies subject to prior consent. In other words,
since 2009 webmasters are compelled to ask users explicit
consent before installing cookies on users’ devices. This holds
in particular for those cookies which are used to profile
users, i.e., persistent in time and managed by a third party.
Conversely, the directive states webmasters are not obliged
to warn users about the usage of technical cookies, which
typically expire at session end. Given this, we expect a user
to download no persistent third-party cookies when she visits
web sites for the first time.
III. BENCHMARK DEFINITION AND DATASET
In this section we describe the methodology for the data
collection, and the datasets we obtain and use to compare the
performance of tracker-blocker plug-ins.
A. Testbed setup
We use active measurements to setup and run our bench-
mark. The platform builds on automatically visiting a pre-
defined set of web pages. We use Selenium [21] and the
Mozilla Firefox browser configured to visit URLs and dump
statistics via HAR (HTTP Archive [22]) files. In a nutshell,
given a set of pages to visit, and a set of profiles, Selenium
loads the profile, runs Firefox, lets it visit each page, and
waits for the browser to return with the OnLoad event.
If the event is not triggered within a timeout of 100s, we
assume there has been some technical issue, and discard the
visit. Between consecutive visits we insert an inactivity period
of 6s. At the end of each visit, we extract the HAR from
the navigation data generated by the browser. The HAR is
a JSON-formatted container for recording HTTP(S) tracing
information. It contains an entry for each object requested by
a web page. This entry includes information such as timings
(e.g., time to fetch DNS information, get a URL) and statistics
about content (e.g., size, download time). We take care of
erasing the browser cache after each visit. Each page is visited
10 times to increase experiments’ reliability.
B. Measurement data collection
In this paper, we consider a scenario in which a user
is browsing the web from her PC. We define the set of
pages to visit by including 100 popular web sites. In more
details, we consider 10 categories of web pages, and, for each
category, we arbitrarily pick 10 distinct Italian popular sites.
In particular, the first returned by Google Search for each
category. We report the entire list of web pages, grouped by
category in Table II.3
As set of profiles, we first build a baseline with no plug-in
installed, that we call Plain in the remainder of the paper. Then,
for each tracker-blocker, we create a fresh Firefox profile in
which we manually install the corresponding plug-in. Thus, in
total we obtain 8 different browser profiles. We install each
plug-in from official Mozilla Firefox add-on page. We use
the default configuration for all of them, except for Ghostery.
Surprisingly, we discovered that by default Ghostery does not
3We explicitly avoid using the Alexa ranking since it includes services
which are questionable for some categories.
enable any filtering capability. Instead, it requires the user
to i) create a Ghostery profile, ii) login to the system, iii)
select advanced preferences, and iv) turn on protection for all
sites. Without this cumbersome process Ghostery provides no
protection.
To observe the impact of the EU ePrivacy Directive on
cookies, we create two browser settings (thus doubling the
number of profiles): in the first one we do not provide
consent to third-party (TP) cookies, so that each visit we
perform corresponds to a “first visit”; for the second one,
we manually visited all the pages, and explicitly clicked on
the “Accept Cookie” banner, when available. That is, the
browser eventually accepts any cookie for each first- and
third-party domains being visited, and the visit to the page
would hence correspond to a “second visit”. At the end, we
erase the browser cache, but retain the cookie database. In
total, we obtain 8 × 2 profiles, and 100 pages, that we visit
10 times each. Web pages can be very dynamic and change
their content frequently during the day (e.g., news portals).
Hence, we carefully design our experiments so that the same
web page is visited by different profiles in a short time (a
few minutes), thus maximizing the probability to encounter
the same contents. For the same reason, we run two parallel
experiments using two identical machines. The first for setup
without consent to TP cookies and the second for setup with
consent to TP cookies.
We use Linux-based Intel Core 2 Quad machines equipped
with 6GB RAM, connected to the Internet through a 1Gb/s
network, and using public IP addresses. In total, data collection
lasted 180 hours approximately. At the end, 16, 000 HAR files
have been collected, which account for about 15GB of data to
process.4
C. List of trackers
To understand how effective plug-ins are at blocking con-
nections with trackers, we extract from the corresponding
HAR file the URLs contacted for downloading all objects for
the page rendering. For each URL, we extract the second-level
domain names, and we mark as third-party all URLs whose
second-level domain does not match with the one of the visited
page. We compare this approach with the one proposed in [23],
which builds on domains’ ADNS (Authoritative DNS) server
to identify third parties, and we observe negligible differences
for the considered set of domains.
We next label those third-party domains which correspond
to trackers. Given the hidden nature of tracking systems, no
ground truth is available. We manually build a super-set of
regular expressions we obtain by joining blacklists from mul-
tiple sources: Ghostery, EasyPrivacy [24], Disconnect [25] and
Princeton Web Census [26].5 Similarly to [27], [9], we match
each third-party domain from HAR files against the super-set
4All software and processed measurement are available for download at
https://bitbucket.org/LGiannantoni/web-privacy-protection-systems. Given its
size, we share the HAR collection on demand.
5Ghostery’s blacklist has been extracted from the Firefox plug-in code
directly.
News Sport Weather Forecast E-Commerce Forums
www.corriere.it www.calcioinrosa.it www.meteoitalia.it www.trovaprezzi.it www.fotopratica.it
www.repubblica.it www.calciomercato.com www.ilmeteo.it www.amazon.it www.clickblog.it
www.rainews.it www.corrieredellosport.it www.tempoitalia.it www.ebay.it www.lightroomcafe.it
www.ansa.it www.fantagazzetta.com www.meteo.it www.glistockisti.it www.zmphoto.it
www.huffingtonpost.it www.figc.it www.centrometeoitaliano.it www.monclick.it www.photo4u.it
www.oggi.it www.gazzetta.it www.nimbus.it www.redcoon.it www.pentaxiani.it
www.news.google.it www.milannews.it www.meteogiornale.it www.subito.it www.dphoto.it
www.tgcom24.mediaset.it www.pianetamilan.it www.datameteo.com www.kijiji.it www.maxartis.it
www.tg24.sky.it www.raisport.rai.it www.meteoconsult.it www.kelkoo.it www.nikonclub.it
www.panorama.it www.sportmediaset.mediaset.it www.meteogiuliacci.it www.twenga.it www.photographers.it
Games Technology Search Engines Hobbies Motors
www.spaziogames.it www.punto-informatico.it www.google.it www.creazioni-or.it www.autoscout24.it
www.gamesvillage.it www.wired.it duckduckgo.com www.ideeperhobby.it www.automobile.it
www.gamespot.com www.hdblog.it search.yahoo.com www.fabiolamarchet.it www.quattroruote.it
giochi-mmo.it www.zeusnews.it www.bing.com www.fantasyehobby.it annunci.quattroruote.it
www.gioco.it www.hwupgrade.it it.ask.com www.ilbauledellanonna.it www.fiat.it
www.flashgames.it www.dynamick.it www.libero.it www.manididonna.it www.autozona.it
www.giochixl.it www.html.it www.starpage.com www.bricoio.it www.blablacar.it
www.1001giochi.it www.ilsoftware.it www.virgilio.it www.lemercerie.it www.motori.it
www.giochigratisonline.it www.mambro.it www.istella.it www.hobbyhobby.it www.motorionline.com
giochi.disney.it www.mrwebmaster.it arianna.libero.it verapaolagino.oneminutesite.it www.motogp.com
TABLE II
WEB SITES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY, GROUPED BY CATEGORY. THESE ARE POPULAR SERVICES IN ITALY.
of rules, and we flag matching domains as trackers. The result-
ing super-set of regular expressions includes 15, 245 entries,
and when applied on our dataset, we observe 1, 140 different
tracking domains. Note that third-party domains might behave
as trackers (i.e., use some user identifier) depending on the
first party they are connected to [27]. In this work, we label
as trackers all domains which match independently from the
web page they are associated to.
IV. METRICS
We are interested in understanding how effective tracker-
blockers are, and in quantifying their impact on the browsing
QoE perceived by the users. Hence, we extract from HAR
files the following set of metrics.
• Contacted Trackers (CTR): This set includes, for each
page, the third-party domains actually contacted by the
browser and present in our list of trackers.
• Contacted Third Parties (CTP ): This set includes, for
each page, the third-party domains actually contacted by the
browser regardless of whether they are in our tracker list.
• Loading Time [s] (LT ): the time needed to download and
display all the elements contained in the web page. More
precisely, we measure this by waiting for the browser to fire
the OnLoad event.
• Volume [bytes] (V ): the overall volume of bytes downloaded
by the browser to build the web page.
CRT and CTP allow us to understand how effective each
tracker-blocker is at protecting user’s privacy. Intuitively, the
larger CTR and CTP , the higher the privacy protection level.
LT and V help us describing the impact on the page loading
speed introduced by each plug-in. In this case, smaller LT
and V should translate in better QoE perceived by the user,
supposing that all content needed to render the page is loaded
correctly.
V. RESULTS
In this section we present the results we obtain by analyzing
the data collected in our measurement campaign. For the
presentation, we follow a top-down approach. We start pre-
senting an overview of per-tracker-blocker results in Sec. V-A.
Then, we provide more detailed per-category and per-web-site
insights in the subsequent sections.
A. Performance overview
Protection from trackers: We start by analyzing the effec-
tiveness of tracker-blockers to protect users’ privacy. For each
visit, we extract from the corresponding HAR file the list of
distinct contacted trackers, CTR. Its size, |CTR|, represents
the number of distinct trackers that have not been blocked.
Hence, the larger |CTR|, the weaker the privacy protection
for the considered browser profile. Considering all visits for a
given profile, we obtain a set of |CTR| samples that we use
to build empirical cumulative distributions. We compute the
5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles and use them to build
the box plots in Figure 1(a). The blue box series refers to the
setting without consent to TP cookies, and the red one to the
case with consent to TP cookies. The leftmost pair of boxes
represents the results for our baseline (Plain). The remaining
browser profiles are sorted by the median value of |CTR|
without consent to TP cookies.
Focusing on the performance of tracker-blockers, we notice
that they show quite different behaviors. Let us consider the
setting without consent to TP cookies first. Request Policy
blocks all cross-site connections, and thus to trackers too. It
is effective at preserving users’ privacy, but at the cost of
breaking the rendering for the vast majority of web pages. The
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Fig. 1. Box plots describing the distribution (5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th) of different metrics for the Plain browser profile and profiles installing different
tracker-blockers. Blue and red series refer to settings with and without consent to TP cookies, respectively.
second best is Ghostery, that apparently misses a few trackers.
More precisely, 2 trackers for 50% of visits. By manually
inspecting these, we observe that most of them belong to
Google and Facebook ecosystems, e.g., fonts.googleapis.com
and facebook.com. We label these as trackers because of our
classification that does not take into account side information
such as context and first parties. For instance, one of the
pages we visit, www.motorionline.com, requires the browser to
fetch support objects from the third-party platform gstatic.com
which is present in our list because it can be found acting as
a tracker in different contexts, although not in this case. We
conclude that Ghostery filters out trackers with a considerable
precision. Next in the rank we find uBlock, Disconnect and
Blur. These miss domains such as intellitxt.com and out-
brain.com. This is rather surprising as these are known trackers
and included in Disconnect’s blacklist [25]. Moving on, Pri-
vacy Badger exhibits poor performance and does not block
a sizable number of trackers. However, this is a consequence
of its behavioral-based anti-tracking mechanism, which needs
time to understand which third parties to stop. We plan to run
a more realistic test where Privacy Badger has been previously
trained. At last, despite not being specialized in defeating
trackers, Adblock Plus blocks some of them, if compared to
the baseline. This is due to the fact that some of the tracker
domains correspond to advertisement platforms too.
Finally, we observe that the number of contacted trackers
for the setup without consent to TP cookies is always larger
than 0. For instance, the baseline Plain shows that half
of the visits include connections to more than 16 different
trackers. On average, 29.5 distinct trackers are contacted in this
configuration. This is very surprising as one would expect the
browser to establish connections with trackers only when the
user provided explicit consent to TP cookies, as required by
the EU directives. Among the trackers involved, we count very
popular ones such as doubleclick.com, scorecardresearch.com
and criteo.com. On the other hand, as expected, we observe
that |CTR| for the setting with consent to TP cookies is
always larger than the case without consent to TP cookies,
but the increment is fairly limited. For instance, for the Plain
configuration, the 75th percentile is equal to 38 for setup with
consent to TP cookies and to 33 without consent to TP cookies.
Similarly, the median increases from 14 to 18.
In summary, for the setting with consent to TP cookies
Request Policy reduces the number of contacted distinct
trackers by 99.9% with respect to the baseline, on average.
Ghostery comes second, with a 91.3% reduction, followed by
uBlock, Disconnect and Blur with 81.8%, 74.9%, and 74.3%,
respectively. Finally, Adblock Plus and Privacy Badger, with
51.6% and 32.7%. The setting without consent to TP cookies
shows similar results.
Contacted third parties: We now analyze the number of
distinct third parties |CTP | that are contacted at each visit.
We report the results in Figure 1(b). As for the number of
trackers, we observe that the amount of contacted third parties
is quite large. The Plain browser contacts more than 19 (23)
third parties in half of the visits in setting without consent to
TP cookies (with consent to TP cookies). By comparing these
numbers with Figure 1(a), we observe that a wide percentage
–78, 9% for setting without consent to TP cookies– of third
parties are trackers. As a consequence, the results in this case
are aligned with those in Figure 1(a). Request Policy blocks all
third parties by design and this clearly breaks page rendering.
Page loading time: We now focus on understanding how
much faster the browser is to render pages when installing
tracker-blockers. Figure 1(c) reports the loading time, LT .
First, we immediately notice that by consenting TP cookies,
the user shall experience a worst QoE. Indeed, the loading
time median increases by 1.3s for Plain profile when cookies
are accepted. By comparing the results of Plain configura-
tion with profiles installing tracker-blockers, we observe that
the filtering of many third parties to contact considerably
decreases the time needed to render the page. In fact, on
average, Request Policy is 67.7% faster than the baseline
for setting with consent to TP cookies. uBlock, Disconnect,
and Blur improve the average loading time by 43.2%, 38.8%
and 28.5%, respectively. Interestingly, Ghostery, which blocks
most of trackers, comes fourth with 23.9% improvement.
Adblock Plus increases the loading speed too, by a mere
16.4% improvement. Very unexpectedly, Privacy Badger even
harms user QoE and it slows down the loading time by
44.1%. We speculate that the behavioral-based anti-tracking
mechanism it implements, requires a larger processing time
than other blacklist-based solutions.
Bandwidth saving: We now investigate the bandwidth saving
provided by tracker-blockers. Figure 1(d) reports the results
for the volume, V , i.e., the total amount of data downloaded
to render the page. Focusing on the Plain profile in setting
without consent to TP cookies, we see that V is lower than
5MB in 75% of the cases. The volume marginally increases
when accepting cookies from third parties. Cookies are indeed
small in size, and as we saw, the page does not change in
content when third-party cookies are accepted or not. Let us
now concentrate on tracker-blockers. They clearly decrease the
amount of bytes to download. Intuitively, one would expect
that the better the tracker-blocker is at blocking trackers, the
larger the bandwidth it saves. This holds for Request Policy,
which decreases the data to download by 65.2% (setup with
consent to TP cookies), and Ghostery, with a 31.2% saving.
Then, we notice Blur, with a 26.1% reduction, followed
by Disconnect, and uBlock, which save 24.4% and 21.7%
bandwidth, respectively. That is, the cost of downloading ads
and tracking data sums as more than 30% of data volume.
Interestingly, Adblock Plus, which specializes in blocking ads,
does not offer the best results (14.7%). This is a little surprise
as it should prevent the browser from downloading heavy
advertisement content such as images and videos. Finally,
as expected, Privacy Badger provides little bandwidth saving
(12.2% only).
Take-away: First, for what concerns tracker-blockers’ perfor-
mance, we can conclude that the anti-tracking mechanisms
they build upon do matter. Blacklist-based tracker-blockers,
Ghostery, uBlock and Disconnect are fairly good at blocking
trackers. They help save bandwidth and accelerate the page
loading as stated by their producers. Instead, the behavior-
based approach employed by Privacy Badger does not provide
good protection since the first visits, and it introduces unnec-
essary extra delays which can severely impair the navigation
experience.6
Second, we observe that EU ePrivacy Directive on cookies
is not respected for a wide number of web sites. In fact, many
trackers are contacted by the browser before the user provides
consent to the usage of third-party cookies. They thus violate
the directive. This said, by consenting to third-party cookies,
the browsing experience degrades by a marginal factor since
content is the same in most of cases.
B. Per-category results
We are now interested in understanding how tracker-
blockers behave for each web-page category. To this end,
we use the results shown in the heatmaps in Figure 2, for
both settings without consent to TP cookies (Figure 2(a)) and
with consent to TP cookies (Figure 2(b)). Each cell reports
the average number of contacted distinct trackers computed
considering all visits generated by the corresponding browser
profile (column) to web pages belonging to the corresponding
category (row). We sort columns and rows based on the
average number of contacted trackers, |CTR|, so that the
cells in the top left corner refer to the cases with high-
est exposure to trackers, and the ones in the bottom right
corner represent the most protected configurations. First, let
us focus on Figure 2(a). As already observed in Sec. V-A,
Plain profile (the leftmost column), our baseline, includes a
large number of trackers, despite the fact that we did not
provide explicit consent to the installation of TP cookies.
Interestingly, not all categories exhibit the same behavior.
In fact, web pages belonging to Weather Forecast, Motors,
Sport, E-commerce and Technology host a larger number
of trackers in general. This is explained by the fact that
these categories are very popular among (Italian) users, and
popular web sites tend to monetize their visits via ads [9].
Focusing on the performance of tracker-blockers, Figure 2(a)
confirms the observation presented in Sec. V-A, with Ghostery
blocking most of the trackers and Privacy Badger showing
the weakest performance. Again, Request Policy blocks all
6We have contacted EFF and are discussing our results with them.
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(b) with consent to TP cookies.
Fig. 2. Heatmaps describing the average number of distinct trackers encoun-
tered for each category and for each browser profile.
cross-site connections, thus breaking pages, but guaranteeing
the best protection from trackers. Observe that values are
larger than 0 in Search Engines categories because of Google
Search site (www.google.it), which embeds support services
(e.g., ssl.gstatic.com), that we label as trackers, but belonging
to Google’s ecosystem, and thus permitted by Request Policy.
Let us now focus on Figure 2(b). By comparing the Plain
column for both settings with and without consent to TP cook-
ies, we observe that more or less all categories are prone to
violate EU ePrivacy Directive. However, the rank of categories
changes: the pages in News and Games double the number of
embedded trackers when TP cookies are accepted, on average.
Instead, pages in other categories have the same number of
trackers when user provides consent to the installation of TP
cookies, confirming that the EU ePrivacy Directive is ignored.
Notice also that for Weather Forecast and E-commerce, the
average number of trackers decreases. This is due to a few
pages, e.g., www.centrometeoitaliano.it that, once provided
consent to third-party cookies, become so slow to trigger the
100s timeout, thus impeding our tool to generate the HAR file.
Take-away: Tracker-blockers show consistent privacy-
preserving performance across different web categories,
Fig. 3. Per-page average loading time, obtained with Plain, uBlock and
Privacy Badger profiles. Pages are sorted based on values obtained with Plain
profile. Setting with consent to TP cookies.
with Ghostery being the most effective. We confirm that
the EU ePrivacy Directive is not respected across all web
categories considered in this study. Even the most popular
categories, only partially respect the policy and already
embed third-party trackers before the users provided consent
to cookie usage.
C. Per-page results
Now, we dig further and study the behavior of some tracker-
blockers on a per-page basis. In particular, we are interested in
better understanding the page load performance they provide,
and if this is uniform across services. To this end, for each
web page and each browser profile, we compute the average
loading time we obtain over the 10 visits. We then sort web
pages based on loading time with Plain profile, and use this as
a reference for comparison. We report the results for uBlock
and Privacy Badger in Figure 3. The plot confirms findings in
Sec. V-A and shows that on average uBlock notably shortens
loading time, whereas Privacy Badger slows down the page
loading. However, this does not hold for all web pages. In fact,
there exist pages whereby uBlock’s improvement is negligible,
and, vice versa, there are pages where Privacy Badger profile
is faster than the baseline. By manually inspecting these
cases, we observe that in general uBlock introduces some
extra delays on web pages which are very lightweight and
take less than 2.5s to load (mostly in the tail of curves in
Sec. V-C). For instance, www.google.it, duckduckgo.com and
www.autoscout24.it. These are pages on which the user pays
the processing overhead introduced by the browser plug-in.
However, this degradation is rather negligible. We observe
similar results for the other tracker-blockers providing good
privacy-protection. Conversely, Privacy Badger improves the
baseline’s loading time for web pages which embed many
third parties, e.g., www.lastampa.it, www.corrieredellosport.it
and www.gamespot.com, where it is able to effectively filter
some trackers.
Take-away: Tracker-blockers improve the loading time, but not
uniformly for all web pages. In fact, pages which are fast to
load suffer the overhead introduced by tracker-blocker plug-
ins. The overall impact is however minimal. Similarly, the
larger processing overhead introduced by Privacy Badger is
amortized on pages rich of third-party content.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly discuss the body of work related
to our study.
Previous studies on web tracking. A number of studies have
quantified the diffusion and pervasiveness of trackers in the
last years. [23] provides an early snapshot of web tracking,
showing that the largest third-party organizations had at least
doubled their presence in sites between 2005 and 2008. Since
then, many papers have shown a worryingly consistent growth
of third-party trackers in the web [28], [29]. Using a passive
measurement perspective, [9] shows that some trackers are
so pervasive to be able to monitor the activity of 96% of
the observed user population. Even more worryingly, trackers
are contacted as soon as users switch on their smartphones
or tablets. Authors of [30] show how Web tracking has
also dramatically grown in complexity. In fact, web trackers
leverage a wide catalog of fingerprinting techniques which are
largely used to uniquely identify users in the web [27]. A
second branch of research has focused on understating how
to identify trackers in the wild. In particular, many studies
focus on defining automatic methodologies to detect tracking
domains [31], [32], [33], [34]. For instance, methodologies
proposed in [33], [34] build on navigation data inspection to
detect persistent user identifiers in order to label third parties
as trackers. The results obtained with such methodologies can
be employed to build accurate blacklists.
Performance of tracker-blockers. Surprisingly, only little is
known about the tracker-blocking tools that are available in the
market. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to present
results of a comprehensive benchmarking of different tracker-
blockers. Moreover, we compare both their effectiveness at
blocking trackers, and their impact on users’ QoE. The only
very related work we could find are [35] and [27]. The former
compares different tracker-blockers, but results are already
outdated, and it does not analyze their impact on web QoE.
The latter evaluates the privacy-preserving performance of
Ghostery only. Similarly to us, it shows that overall Ghostery
is effective at detecting and blocking connections to trackers.
However, differently, our experiments are conducted to com-
pare several tracker-blockers from different perspectives and
with different settings for third-party cookies.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our analysis presents some limitations hereby briefly dis-
cussed.
i) Our measurement campaign is based on a limited number
of web pages and categories. However, from our results clear
trends emerge. We are confident that increasing the number of
URLs would lead us to obtain similar results.
ii) The tool we designed to automatically browse URLs does
not interact with pages as real users do. Hence, our results
pertain only to homepages. This is common with studies based
on similar measurement campaigns, e.g., [27].
iii) Privacy Badger shows weak performance because it is
penalized by our testbed settings. In fact, our tool starts with
a fresh profile at each visit, thus preventing Privacy Badger,
whose tracker-detection algorithm builds on browser’s history,
to identify and block trackers effectively [36].
iv) Our measurements were collected from Linux-based
servers in our lab, connected to the Internet with a 1Gb/s
network, public IP addresses, and without proxy nor NATs.
Hence, real users who access the Internet through residen-
tial or commercial connection might perceive different QoE.
Furthermore, we used a browser from a single firm (Firefox).
Other browsers might load web pages differently, and they
offer their own sets of APIs, which might change tracker-
blockers’ performance.
v) Despite our method of classifying trackers being fairly
standard in the literature [27], [9], the list of trackers we
employ for this purpose can not be considered as an actual
ground truth. For instance, our list might miss very novel
trackers. However, we do not expect this to bias our results.
vi) Our analysis is limited to understanding the impact of
tracker-blockers based on a few set of metrics. However, the
amount of information contained in HAR files is rich and it
includes data on cookies and objects installed by third parties
that we plan to investigate in the future.
For our future work, we plan to run larger and more
comprehensive measurement campaigns in order to overcome
the limitations described above. In particular, we are run-
ning experiments on larger catalogs of URLs and involving
more complex profiles, different browsers, operating systems,
and network scenarios. We are also including other tracker-
blockers not considered in this paper. Moreover, we will dig
further in our data by analyzing other metrics.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a systematic benchmark and comparison
of tracker-blockers available in the market. We leveraged a
sizable dataset of automatically generated traffic summaries to
evaluate the effectiveness of several tracker-blockers to protect
users’ browsing from trackers and qualitatively estimate how
they affect web QoE. We also considered different settings,
based on users’ consent to install third-party cookies as
required by the EU ePrivacy Directive. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to conduct this kind of study.
Our results are in part surprising.
First, we conclude that the most prominent tracker-blockers
are rather effective at identifying and blocking traffic toward
trackers. In particular, Ghostery, if properly enabled, offers the
best protection from trackers (91.3% of trackers blocked), fol-
lowed by uBlock, Disconnect and Blur which are surprisingly
unable to capture connections to some very popular tracker
domains.
We also tested tracker-blockers from another angle, and
evaluated their impact on bandwidth usage and user web QoE.
Enabling tracker-blockers reduces bandwidth usage up to 30%.
For instance, Ghostery can reduce the amount of downloaded
data by 31.2%. Instead, web QoE is impacted differently.
uBlock is the best at accelerating page loading being 43.2%
faster than the baseline. Ghostery is only fourth in the rank,
with 23.9% acceleration. Privacy Badger exhibits a negative
impact on loading time, which increases by 44.1%.
Finally, we observe that the ePrivacy Directive is ignored by
the vast majority of considered web pages, and a wide number
of third-party trackers (29.5 on average) is contacted before
users provide consent to third-party cookies.
We believe our results can guide the average Internet user
to make an informed choice on tracker-blockers, and help
developers and practitioners design better tracker-blocking
technologies.
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